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A DIFFERENT VIEW OF HABEAS:
INTERPRETING AEDPA'S "ADJUDICATED ON
THE MERITS" CLAUSE WHEN HABEAS
CORPUS IS UNDERSTOOD AS AN APPELLATE
FUNCTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
Margery L Miller*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a situation where an individual has been convicted of a
crime in state court and sentenced to a term of incarceration. The
prisoner challenges both his conviction and his sentence. Raising a
federal claim in his state's appellate court, he claims the state trial
court prevented defense counsel from inquiring into the description
the eyewitness gave police, violating the accused's Sixth Amendment
right to confront a witness against him.' Assuming the prisoner
properly raised this issue in his state court's trial and appellate system,
a state court may address this hypothetical prisoner's Sixth
Amendment claim in three possible ways in a written decision.
First, the state appellate court may address the prisoner's Sixth
Amendment challenge specifically and provide relevant federal
precedent in denying the claim. In this situation, any subsequent
court to hear the petitioner's claim will have a clear idea of why the
state court decided as it did. Second, the state appellate court may
issue an opinion that simply states, "Petitioner's claims are without
merit, and are therefore denied." This scenario creates a question for
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Abner Greene for his insight and assistance throughout this process, and
the Honorable Denny Chin for inspiring this project by giving me the opportunity as
an intern to review a petition for writ of habeas corpus. I am grateful to my family,
especially my parents, Suzy and Gary Miller, for teaching me not only to think, but to
enjoy myself doing it. And lastly, to Dan Shanoff for his cheerful wit about writs.
1. This situation is hypothetical, but is loosely based on one of the claims in Riley
v. Goord, No. 02 Civ. 5884_DC, 2003 WL 22966278, at *5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2003). In Riley, the petitioner claimed that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated
during a pretrial hearing where his attorney was "cut off" from effectively cross-
examining a witness. Id. at *5. Riley may be distinguished from the hypothetical here,
however, because in that case the petitioner waived his right to challenge this possible
Sixth Amendment violation by pleading guilty to the charges against him. Id. at *5-*6.
This Note's hypothetical assumes no guilty plea or other procedural grounds for the
state court to have dismissed the petitioner's claim.
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any subsequent reviewing court as to both why any or all of the
prisoner's claims were denied, and whether the state court actually
considered all of the prisoner's claims, including the Sixth
Amendment claim in particular. Finally, a state appellate court may
discuss some of a prisoner's claims in varying levels of detail, but
completely fail to mention the prisoner's Sixth Amendment claim. In
this last type of decision, any subsequent reviewing court would not
know whether the state appellate court considered the prisoner's Sixth
Amendment claim at all.
Regardless of how the state appellate court constructs its decision,
the petitioner has the right to challenge his incarceration, even after
exhausting his state appeals, by submitting a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus ("habeas" or "habeas corpus") to a federal district
court.2 The writ of habeas corpus provides prisoners a forum to re-
litigate their federal constitutional claims even where those claims
have already been litigated in state court.' The ability of a state
prisoner to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus is an
important way in which our criminal justice system protects the right
of individuals to obtain relief when they have been unjustly
imprisoned.4 It is difficult to imagine how a federal court could
adequately protect individuals' rights if that court is unsure whether
2. The writ of habeas corpus is the traditional means by which individuals
challenge a deprivation of their freedom in violation of law. See Larry W. Yackle,
Federal Courts: Habeas Corpus 1 (2003). The writ is "best known as a mechanism
for challenging the most egregious breaches of individual liberty." Id. Currently, the
writ is most commonly employed by prisoners making "constitutional claims
anchored in the procedural safeguards established by the Bill of Rights and applicable
to state cases via the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 60. Federal habeas review
courts are not typically concerned with claims of innocence or guilt. See id. at 59.
Thus, the writ is not intended to address the appropriateness of a conviction, but
should grant relief on "claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of
the underlying state criminal proceedings." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416
(1993); see also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (habeas is concerned
"not [with] the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their
constitutional rights have been preserved"). To petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a
prisoner must meet a variety of procedural and jurisdictional requirements. For
example, the prisoner must be "in custody" in violation of federal law at the time his
petition is filed. Yackle, supra, at 147. Additionally, the prisoner must have
"exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal claims." Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). And finally, a prisoner must meet the
appropriate filing deadlines noted in the habeas statutes. See Yackle, supra, at 166-67.
For a short description of the process by which a state prisoner may bring his claim to
a federal habeas court, see Claudia Wilner, Note, "We Would Not Defer to that Which
Did Not Exist": AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1442, 1444 n.15 (2002). Wilner bases her interpretation of AEDPA's "adjudicated on
the merits" clause on a combination of factors, discussed infra note 177; however, this
Note reaches its interpretation by viewing habeas corpus within the larger context of
the federal judiciary's power of appellate review of state court decisions. Id.
3. See Wilner, supra note 2, at 1447.
4. Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 Duke L.J. 947, 967 (2000).
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the state court that first heard the federal claims even considered
those claims. The ability to grant a habeas petition allows federal
courts to ensure that states are interpreting and applying federal law
in a uniform and fair manner, but also protects the rights of
individuals to obtain relief when they have been imprisoned unjustly.
As the above hypothetical makes clear, the ability of a federal court to
understand the decision of a state appellate court is a fundamental
part of that federal court's ability to determine if the state both
interpreted and applied federal law in a fair and just way.
The most recent changes to the scope of the writ of habeas corpus
occurred with the passage of amendments to the habeas statutes in
1996 in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA").5 In the AEDPA, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) to place additional limits on the types of claims6 that federal
habeas review courts7 may consider: AEDPA requires, inter alia, that
an increased level of deference be given by federal habeas review
courts to state court decisions regarding the federal constitutional
question presented in the habeas petition.8 As part of the AEDPA
revisions, Congress provided that this increased level of deference
would apply only to those cases that were "adjudicated on the
merits."9  Congress did not, however, define "adjudicated on the
5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
6. These limitations are not substantive in nature (i.e., Congress did not use
AEDPA to forbid the writ of habeas corpus for all drug-related sentences or for
claims based on the Sixth Amendment), but instead focus on the level of deference
the federal habeas review courts must apply in reviewing a state court decision
regarding a federal question. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Habeas Review of Perfunctory
State Court Decisions on the Merits, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 223, 226 (2002) ("AEDPA...
amended habeas law to direct federal courts to accord extreme deference to state
court determinations of federal law." (citation omitted)); Brittany Glidden, When the
State Is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA's Adjudication Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 177, 180-81 (2002) ("Seeking to increase the efficiency of habeas
and the finality of state decisions, Congress drafted § 2254(d), which gives state
decisions significant deference."); Hoffstadt, supra note 4, at 950. Hoffstadt notes
that,
[b]y and large, [the Supreme Court and Congress] have restricted the writ by
making it less available as a practical matter through the creation and
expansion of procedural barriers to federal habeas review. They have rarely
chosen to narrow the writ directly by limiting the types of federal
constitutional claims that state petitioners can bring.
Id. (citation omitted). This Note does not address these limitations in any great detail
except to acknowledge that they require federal habeas review courts to afford this
higher level of deference to state court decisions. This Note's focus, instead, is on the
process by which courts determine if they apply this new standard of deference, or the
pre-AEDPA de novo standard of review. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
7. The terms "habeas review court" or "habeas court" are used in this Note
simply to refer to a federal district court that is reviewing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
8. See supra note 6.
9. See infra text accompanying note 124; Part I.C.2.
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merits," and the Supreme Court has not provided a clear definition
for the lower federal courts to apply.10
In evaluating habeas petitions under AEDPA, therefore, the lower
federal courts have been left to determine for themselves whether a
federal claim has been adjudicated on the merits in prior state
proceedings," a determination that has a significant impact on the
ability of a state prisoner to ensure that his constitutional rights are
being protected. 2 In most cases, the circuit courts debate and discuss
the definition of "adjudicated on the merits" in terms of the standard
of review federal courts must apply in reviewing state court
decisions. 3 By focusing on the appropriate standard of review for
federal courts to apply to state court decisions, the lower federal
courts have not found a unified or effective means of understanding
and/or applying AEDPA's new language regarding habeas review. 14
Instead, confusion and controversy over the language have led to a
split among the circuit courts as to how the lower federal courts
should apply the "adjudicated on the merits" clause of 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) in practice. 5
This Note argues that the federal courts' focus on the standard of
review to be applied to state court decisions in habeas cases is the
wrong approach to understanding the definition of "adjudicated on
the merits." Further, this Note argues that the interpretation of
10. See infra Parts I.C.2., II; see also Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 53 (2d
Cir. 2001) (noting that the question of the meaning of "adjudicated on the merits" is
"a difficult question that has divided the Courts of Appeals"); Dodson, supra note 6,
at 227-28 n.26 (providing a comparison of many different circuit court cases and
identifying their differences in how they interpret "adjudicated on the merits").
11. See Glidden, supra note 6, at 182 (commenting that "for every case that falls
under AEDPA's domain, the federal habeas court initially must determine if the state
court adjudicated each claim" but also noting that "[flederal courts have been unable
to reach a consensus on what qualifies as an 'adjudication"' (citation omitted)).
12. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
13. See generally infra Part II. It is important to note here that, as will be
mentioned repeatedly in this Note, the AEDPA amendments to the statute governing
the writ of habeas corpus did create a new standard of review for federal courts to
apply to certain state court decisions on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2)
(2000). The analysis and application of that new standard of review should be
separate from the question of whether the state "adjudicated" a prisoner's federal
claims "on the merits." Such separation, however, is less common than it should be
among circuit court discussions of the AEPDA amendments. See infra note 150 and
accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II (describing the current split between the circuits regarding
how to correctly interpret and apply the "adjudicated on the merits" clause of the
AEDPA habeas statute).
15. The majority of the circuit courts read the term "adjudicated on the merits"
broadly, considering any claim not dismissed on procedural grounds to have been
"adjudicated on the merits." See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. A
minority of circuits has held that a state court's decision should not be considered
"adjudicated on the merits" unless that state court provides indication in its opinion
that it evaluated the federal claim by applying federal law. See infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS
"adjudicated on the merits" adopted by the majority of circuits is
wrong because the majority considers any non-procedural basis for
denial an "adjudication on the merits," even where the state court
does not mention a federal claim in its opinion.'6  Instead,
"adjudicated on the merits" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) must be
defined to encompass only those federal claims for which a state court
has actually provided some explanation in its decision.
Commentators have articulated this Note's preferred definition of
"adjudicated on the merits" and justified it based on factors such as
the legislative intent of Congress in enacting the AEDPA, the specific
language of the statute, and examination of possible approaches the
Supreme Court might take based on its general approach to habeas
cases. 7 In contrast, this Note takes a broader view of the writ of
habeas corpus as an exercise of the federal judicial appellate review
power granted to the federal judiciary.'" This Note argues that federal
habeas review should be viewed as an appeal under the federal
judiciary's appellate jurisdiction rather than an independent civil
process unrelated to the constitutional grant of power to the federal
judiciary. 9 A habeas court is thus an appellate court with a role
similar to that of the Supreme Court in its ability to grant direct
review of federal claims that have been decided by a state court.2° In
fact, federal habeas courts are, according to some, surrogates for the
Supreme Court, whose docket is too crowded to hear most of the
federal claims raised by state prisoners. 21
Thus, a comparison of habeas review to the well-established
practice of Supreme Court direct review provides a compelling
framework for understanding and interpreting "adjudicated on the
merits" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of AEDPA. Employing this
analogy, it will become apparent that "adjudicated on the merits"
must mean that state courts have the opportunity to interpret and
apply federal law to federal questions; where they fail to do so, a
federal court must review any questions of federal law de novo.
Part I provides general background about federal judicial review of
state court decisions. It then discusses the evolution of Supreme
Court direct review and general federal review of habeas petitions by
state prisoners throughout history, and the role each plays in today's
federal criminal system. Part II more specifically outlines the
controversy at issue regarding the definition of "adjudicated on the
merits." It first discusses the current analytical framework underlying
16. See infra Part II.A.1.
17. This is not an exhaustive list. See infra note 177 for additional discussion
regarding the interpretation of "adjudicated on the merits."
18. See infra Part III.A.; see also notes 189-90, 193 and accompanying text.
19. See generally Part III.B.
20. See infra notes 189-90, 193 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
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the debate over interpreting "adjudicated on the merits," and
provides an overview of the disagreement among circuits. It then
illustrates the practical impact this interpretation has on the criminal
justice system and the ability of individual defendants to challenge the
constitutionality of their state convictions. Part III argues that the
current analytical framework for understanding "adjudicated on the
merits" has resulted in a majority of circuits applying the wrong
interpretation of the phrase. Courts and commentators should instead
view habeas corpus petitions within the larger context of the federal
judiciary's powers of appellate review of state court decisions. Under
this view, a federal claim in state court would be considered
"adjudicated on the merits" only where the state court has provided
some discussion of the federal claim in its decision.
I. FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE COURT DECISIONS
In current practice, federal judicial review of state court decisions is
primarily seen in the Supreme Court's power of direct review,22 and in
the lower federal courts' power to review habeas corpus petitions
submitted by state prisoners.23 Both provide the federal judiciary with
the authority to review otherwise final state court decisions regarding
questions of federal law. However, there is one key difference
between them. Direct Supreme Court review is a well-accepted part
of the larger array of the appellate powers of the federal judiciary
granted by Article 11I.24 On the other hand, the writ of habeas corpus
is more controversial as an application of the federal appellate
jurisdiction because it, in essence, allows the lower federal courts-
rather than only the Supreme Court-to exercise this appellate
power.25
22. See Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts 162 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that "by
common account" the Supremacy Clause "contemplate[s] ... that [state court]
decisions will be subject to the discipline of a hierarchical appellate authority located
in the 'one supreme Court' the Constitution makes mandatory" (citation omitted)).
Yackle also discusses the Supreme Court's modem appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 165.
23. See Yackle, supra note 2, at 4 ("As a practical matter,... federal court action
on habeas petitions from state prisoners has an undeniable appellate flavor.").
Yackle does note, however, some disagreement with, or criticism of, this
characterization of habeas corpus. Id. at 49. Yackle notes that following Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), "critics charged that the Court (mis)construed the habeas
corpus statues to confer on lower federal courts an effective appellate jurisdiction to
review state court judgments for error.... [Such] power exceeded the scope of
appellate jurisdiction, conventionally understood." Yackle, supra note 2, at 49.
24. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
25. Compare Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 335-
38 (1988) (noting that concerns about considering habeas courts as appellate courts
"derive generally from the awkward prospect of a 'lower' federal court, particularly a
district court, reviewing the work of a state's highest court" but still advocating for a
view of habeas courts as exercising appellate power), and James S. Liebman,
Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review
Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997, 2055-56 (1992) (discussing the view of federal habeas
2598 [Vol. 72
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Thus, the history and scope of each of these different mechanisms
by which federal courts review state court decisions on federal
questions are typically discussed separately, both by courts and by
commentators. That is, the writ of habeas corpus is rarely
contemplated within the context of federal judicial review or the
appellate power of the federal judiciary; quite the contrary is true of
discussion about direct Supreme Court review.26 This part looks at the
history of both means of federal court review of state court decisions.
A review of the history provides a foundation for this Note's
argument that the well-established direct review analysis informs
analysis of the meaning of "adjudicated on the merits" in the habeas
corpus statute because both fall within the overall rubric of federal
appellate review, as granted by Article III of the United States
Constitution.
A. Judicial Review in General
The Supreme Court's appellate review power, now commonly
called judicial review,27 has been the subject of much commentary and
controversy throughout American legal history.2" Judicial review was
originally established in Article III of the United States Constitution,
which vests the "judicial Power" of the United States in "one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
as a limited "appeal as of right" that, "[a]s a substitute for federal direct appeal,...
has never duplicated, but has always mirrored the scope of, Supreme Court review on
direct appeal" (emphasis omitted)); with Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus,
Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 888, 910 (1998) (criticizing
the idea that any court other than the Supreme Court of the United States may have
"appellate jurisdiction over both systems"). Scheidegger goes on to say that "[t]here
was no presumption that the lower federal courts had a 'superintending' function over
the state courts." Id.
26. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 261-73. Friedman discusses the dearth of
commentary about habeas by pointing to the procedural and substantive justifications
given by commentators for continued existence of the writ. Id. His article concludes,
though, that habeas is better understood and justified when viewed as an appeal that
operates within the federal system in much the same way as direct Supreme Court
review. Id. at 331; see also infra Part III.B. (discussing habeas as an appellate function
of the federal judiciary).
27. The term "judicial review" was evidently "an invention of law writers in the
early twentieth century." David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept
of Judicial Review, 42 Duke L.J. 279, 280 n.2 (1992) (quoting Robert L. Clinton,
Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review 7 (1989)).
28. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2-10 (1959). Professor Wechsler's paper is a reproduction of a
speech given as the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School on
April 7, 1959. Id. at 1. In his introductory comments, Professor Wechsler noted
discussions at Harvard among scholars such as Justice Jackson and Judge Learned
Hand regarding "the role of courts in general and the Supreme Court in particular,"
in the few years prior to his lecture, and the broader attention being paid to the
subject of judicial review and judicial supremacy in the greater academic community.
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time ordain and establish. '2 9 Article III then provides, in Section 2,
that the federal judicial power "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution."3 The Constitution further
provides that the Supreme Court was to "have appellate Jurisdiction"
over other cases, as regulated by Congress.31 Thus, other than in the
specific circumstances identified in the Constitution, the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and of other federal courts is determined by
Congress.3 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court has appellate rather than
original jurisdiction over those matters not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution.33
Article III does not specify the scope of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction, or qualify the jurisdiction according to the type
of court that originally decided the matter. There seems to be no
reason, then, to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction to "cases" or
"controversies" originating only in federal courts.34 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court may exercise its appellate review power over
questions of federal or constitutional law regardless of whether those
questions were first considered in a lower federal court or in a state
court.35
Despite this justification for allowing Supreme Court review of state
court decisions regarding federal questions, such federal review of
state judicial opinions clearly creates questions of federalism and the
role of states in applying federal laws, as required by the Supremacy
Clause.36 The Supremacy Clause states that the "Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."37
The Supremacy Clause obligates state courts to interpret the
Constitution and enforce federal laws in the same way the federal
judiciary would.3 s Some commentators believe, though, that federal
judicial review power maintains the supremacy of federal law as the
law of the United States because the federal judiciary should be the
final and ultimate interpreter of those laws.39 Indeed, the tension
29. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
30. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
31. Id.
32. See Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1703, 1703 (2000).
33. See Yackle, supra note 22, at 157-62.
34. Id. at 162.
35. See id. at 157.
36. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
37. Id.
38. See Yackle, supra note 22, at 162.
39. See id. at 165; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."); Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a "Unified Judiciary," 78
Tex. L. Rev. 1513, 1523 (2000) (noting that the decisions of federal courts "cannot be
subject to revision or supplantation by legislatures, executive officials, or even state
[Vol. 722600
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between the idea of dual judicial sovereignty and the appellate power
of the federal judiciary to review state court decisions is a relatively
common theme in current legal scholarship.40
Yet the idea of "judicial review" as a means for the federal
government to evaluate or examine the acts of state officials-
including acts of the states' judiciary branches-has been
controversial since the early years of American history.4' In
particular, at its inception, the Court's assertion of its power to force
the states' courts to follow its interpretation of the Constitution was
most controversial.42 Rather than focusing on the separation of
powers or congressional supremacy over the judiciary, the controversy
and debate centered on questions about federalism and states' rights.43
The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, firmly
established its appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions in two
important cases between 1815 and 1825. 44 First, in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 5 the Marshall Court, in an opinion written by Justice Story,
overturned the Virginia Supreme Court's 1814 holding that state and
federal governments were independent of one another and parallel in
courts"); Liebman, supra note 25, at 2097 ("Federal law is supreme, as is federal
adjudication of that law when mandated by Congress.").
40. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 25, at 335 (noting that one of the more
common objections to habeas review is that it is an affront to notions of comity, which
"concerns the respect that judges in coordinate judicial systems accord each other's
work and the need to avoid one court system's interference in the work of another");
Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
How Should AEDPA's Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001
Wis. L. Rev. 1493, 1509 (noting that the constitutional concerns inherent in
interpretation of AEDPA's changes to the habeas statute "will continue to be a
fundamental part of the long-running debate on whether federal habeas courts should
defer to state courts on issues of federal law" (emphasis omitted)).
41. See Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and its Alternatives: An American Tale,
38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 415, 416 (2003).
42. See id. at 417.
43. See id.
44. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Some commentators also include a third case,
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), when discussing
the Marshall Court's establishment of federal appellate jurisdiction over state court
decisions. See Farber, supra note 41, at 431-32. In Osborn, the Marshall Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, rejected a state claim of sovereign immunity. See
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 848-49. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion argued that if states
were immune from all federal suits they would be able to "attack[] the nation" and
"arrest[] its progress at every step." Id. at 848. Osborn must be differentiated from
Martin and Cohens for purposes of this analysis, though, because it involved the
power of states to impose a fine or penalty on the federal government or federal
officials. Martin and Cohens, in contrast, dealt with a question of which court's
interpretation of a federal or constitutional question should be the "final" word.
Osborn does, though, provide another example of the Marshall Court's overall
endorsement of complete sovereignty by the Supreme Court over state courts. See
Farber, supra note 41, at 431-32.
45. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 304.
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their ability and jurisdiction to apply the Constitution.46 Justice Story
grounded his opinion in a broad view of the Constitution, noting that
it was the supreme law over the citizens of the United States as well as
each of the states and their branches of government individually.4 7
The Court held that its appellate jurisdiction included the ability to set
aside unconstitutional actions of state executive and legislative
officials; its jurisdiction must, then, also include review of the
decisions of the state judiciary branch. 8
The Supreme Court reiterated this view five years later in Cohens v.
Virginia.49 There, Chief Justice Marshall claimed even more power
for the national government and its Constitution."0 Marshall declared
that the states had only limited sovereignty, and that the federal
judiciary was the most appropriate body to interpret federal law so
that it would be consistently interpreted throughout the nation.5 '
Thus the Marshall Court effectively subordinated state courts to the
Supreme Court of the United States.52 Moreover, the general
structure established in those early days of the nation has generally
remained in place and is seldom challenged. 3
Another controversial aspect of judicial review is whether the
inferior federal courts also have the appellate power to review
decisions by state courts. Following the ratification of the
Constitution, Congress established the lower federal courts in the
Judiciary Act of 1789."4 Through that seminal legislation, Congress
established the circuit courts, which were granted both original and
appellate jurisdiction, and the district courts, which were granted only
original jurisdiction. In addition, the circuit courts were initially not
assigned judges and instead were staffed by either Supreme Court
justices or by district court judges.56  The Judiciary Act of 1789
granted, with some level of specificity, jurisdiction to the different
46. Id. at 362; see also Farber, supra note 41, at 426.
47. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 342-43; see also Farber, supra note 41, at 427.
48. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 34344; see also Farber, supra note 41, at 427.
49. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 264.
50. Farber, supra note 41, at 428-29.
51. Id. at 429.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 417-20, 432.
54. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Yackle, supra note 22, at 38. The discussion about
creation of lower federal courts was a contentious one at the Constitutional
Convention. A particular divide existed between those who believed the Constitution
should include explicit directions for the creation of the lower federal courts, and
those who felt the state courts already in operation should be the only inferior courts
for the nation. Id. at 31. This disagreement is often said to have been resolved
through the "Madisonian Compromise," which resulted in an agreement that the
Constitution would allow Congress to create lower federal courts, but not require it.
Id.
55. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 73; Yackle, supra note 22, at 38.
56. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 74-75; Yackle, supra note 22, at 38 & n.54.
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federal courts.57 It did not, however, provide the federal courts with
the entire grant of power included in Article 11I.58 The remainder of
this part provides background about both direct review and the writ of
habeas corpus.59
B. Direct Review
Federal review of state judgments on questions of federal law was
first established by the Judiciary Act of 1789.60 Congress specifically
provided the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review a civil
judgment made by any of the lower federal courts or by a state
judiciary's highest court.6" This jurisdiction took the form of the writ
of error, but did not include appellate jurisdiction over federal
criminal cases.62 More importantly, the 1789 Act only allowed
Supreme Court review of "final" judgments made by the "highest"
state court where the party making the federal claim lost in the prior
proceedings.63 Congress's initial grant of review existed in its general
form until 1914.64
The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to review state court
decisions is currently governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1257.65 Under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a), the Supreme Court may review a final state court
judgment
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn
in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
57. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 76-92; Yackle, supra note 22, at 38-39. In particular, the
jurisdictional assignments depended largely on the nature of the parties involved,
such as the establishment of Supreme Court original jurisdiction for all cases in which
a state was a party, and the establishment of federal jurisdiction for any federal court
in diversity cases or cases where the United States was a party. Yackle, supra note 22,
at 38-39. Important to this analysis, the Act also gave the Supreme Court and the
inferior courts authority to consider habeas petitions submitted by individuals in
federal custody. Id. at 39. The extension of the writ of habeas corpus to individuals in
state custody is discussed infra Part I.C.
58. See Yackle, supra note 22, at 39. Yackle discusses specifically the failure of
Congress to grant the lower federal courts general jurisdiction to hear cases involving
federal questions. Id.
59. Because direct review is a more obvious and natural example of the Court's
appellate power, greater emphasis is placed in this part on providing an explanation
of the writ of habeas corpus within the context of federal judicial review powers.
60. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 81; Yackle, supra note 22, at 165.
61. See Yackle, supra note 22, at 40.
62. See id. at 40 & n.62. Although the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction
over criminal cases, individuals held in federal custody could still appeal their
incarceration to the Supreme Court through the writ of habeas corpus. See infra Part
I.C.; see also Liebman, supra note 25, at 2058-59.
63. See Yackle, supra note 22, at 165.
64. See id.
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000); Yackle, supra note 22, at 165.
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Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or
authority exercised under, the United States. 66
The scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on direct review under
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) is well-established.67 However, this appellate
function of the Court may only be triggered where two minimum
conditions are met: (1) that a substantial federal claim was "either
addressed by or properly presented to the state court that rendered
the decision" in question,68 and (2) that the state court issued a final
judgment.69
To meet the first condition, the party making the federal claim must
both present the question to the highest state court with jurisdiction to
consider it and make the state court aware that the question is of a
federal nature.7° Parties raising a federal question must typically do so
within the parameters of the procedural rules in the state where the
case originated.71 Where a state court is silent as to a federal claim,
the Supreme Court assumes the challenging party failed to properly
raise the issue. The challenging party has the burden of showing that
the federal "issue was properly presented to that court," and "that the
state court had 'a fair opportunity to address the federal question that
is sought to be presented"' to the Supreme Court.72
To meet the second condition, the highest state court must have
issued a final judgment regarding the federal question.73 This was a
strict requirement under the 1789 Act; however, more recently, the
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
67. See, e.g., Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 86 (1997) ("[I]n reviewing state-
court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1257... we will not consider a petitioner's federal
claim unless it was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court that
rendered the decision we have been asked to review."); Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493,
496-97 (1981) ("It is a long-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court to re-
examine the final judgment of a state court can arise only if the record as a whole
shows either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim was adequately
presented in the state system."); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969) ("It
was very early established that the Court will not decide federal constitutional issues
raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions.").
68. Adams, 520 U.S. at 86; Yackle, supra note 22, at 165.
69. Yackle, supra note 22, at 165-66.
70. Cardinale, 394 U.S. at 438 (noting that the Supreme Court has "no jurisdiction
unless a federal question was raised and decided in the state court below"); Yackle,
supra note 22, at 165 (noting that in "present[ing] a federal question to the highest
state court with jurisdiction to consider it" litigants "must make the state court aware
of the federal character of the question").
71. Adams, 520 U.S. at 87 (noting that petitioners may either "establish that the
claim was raised at the time and in the manner required by the state law" or they may
"demonstrate that [they] presented the particular claim at issue ... with fair precision
and in due time" (internal quotations omitted)).
72. Adams, 520 U.S. at 86-87 (quoting Webb, 451 U.S. at 501); see also Michael J.
Wahoske, Raising and Preserving Federal Questions in State Court Cases, Brief,
Winter 1997, at 54-55 (providing an overview of the steps litigants should take to
ensure their federal claim may be considered by the Supreme Court).
73. See Yackle, supra note 22, at 166.
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Court has become a bit more flexible in its consideration of what
constitutes a "final" judgment for purposes of establishing its
appellate jurisdiction.74 Some believe this flexibility has developed,
despite its controversial nature, to allow the Court the opportunity "to
examine federal claims at the time and in the posture best suited to
maintaining the accuracy, uniformity, and supremacy of federal law. '75
This second condition also tends to be more contentious than the first
because the desire to preserve the finality of a state court decision is
an oft-cited element of arguments opposing federal review of such
state court decisions.76
The Supreme Court typically justifies these two conditions by
claiming that they better allow states to exercise their right and
responsibility to interpret the Constitution and federal law.77 That is,
the Court requires federal questions to be brought before state courts
because "in a federal system it is important that state courts be given
the first opportunity to consider the applicability of state statutes in
light of constitutional challenge, since the statutes may be construed in
a way which saves their constitutionality. 7 8 These conditions also
provide a challenging party the opportunity to show it presented its
federal question to the state court, and that the state court ignored it.
In this way, a state court cannot escape direct review by the Supreme
Court simply by ignoring a federal question.79 Importantly, even
where a state court has fulfilled this "decided" prong of the direct
review standard, it remains up to the Supreme Court to determine
whether the state court's interpretation and application of federal law
was correct.8 0
74. See id.
75. Id.; see also Caminker, supra note 39, at 1520.
76. See e.g., Caminker, supra note 39, at 1523 ("Both scholars and the Court have
declared that finality is one of the essential attributes of the judicial power vested in
federal courts. .. ").
77. See Yackle, supra note 22, at 117-18 (noting that while state courts are not
actually vested with "the judicial Power" granted to federal courts by Article III of
the Constitution, the authority of the state courts to decide Article III types of cases,
such as federal question cases, has never been challenged by the Supreme Court
except where Congress has limited the state courts' authority by statute). In
particular, Yackle reminds readers that the Madisonian Compromise, see supra note
54, was partially based on the idea that state courts were able (and allowed) to do
Article III business. Yackle, supra note 22, at 118. Yackle also points to the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, which binds state
judges to the Constitution and thus contemplates that those judges may adjudicate
cases that involve federal and constitutional questions. Id.
78. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969); see also Adams v. Robertson,
520 U.S. 83, 91 (1997).
79. See Wahoske, supra note 72, at 55.
80. See, e.g., Adams, 520 U.S. at 90-91; Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 499-500
(1981). This idea of comity and providing state courts the opportunity to correct
constitutional defects before the federal court reviews their decisions is also seen in
discussions about habeas petitions, and, in particular, the exhaustion requirement.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,
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Still, the Supreme Court provides each state with an incentive to
maintain its power of independent review by requiring state courts to
review any and all federal questions before the Court will hear and
review those federal questions. 1  This incentive to the states is
actually quite practical: Requiring an issue to be raised in state court
allows a state to resolve a claim on some state law ground82 and
promotes "the creation of an adequate factual and legal record"
should the need for federal review arise.83
C. Habeas Corpus
1. An Overview and History of "The Great Writ"
The writ of habeas corpus has been the subject of much discussion
and debate throughout its history.' Generally, scholars accept that
the federal writ of habeas corpus has provided federal prisoners the
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of their incarceration
since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789.85 Despite the early
flurry of jurisprudence reinforcing the federal judiciary's power to
review state court decisions regarding federal or Constitutional
questions, 6 the writ was not extended to state prisoners until 1867
with the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act.87 Under the Act of 1867,
the writ became available "in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of
6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).
81. See Webb, 451 U.S. at 499-500.
82. A state may resolve a federal or constitutional question on independent and
adequate state grounds, and thereby preclude a federal court from considering that
question on appeal. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Ford v.
Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). More specifically,
federal courts may not review habeas claims decided by a state court on state grounds
that are "'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for
the court's decision." Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. An exception to this rule, though, exists
if the "last state court rendering a judgment" does not clearly state that its judgment is
based on adequate and independent state grounds. Id. at 263. Typically, state
procedural rules constitute adequate and independent state grounds, but only if those
rules are "'firmly established and regularly followed."' Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71,
77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24). In making this determination,
federal courts should defer to state court findings of procedural default where they
are supported by "a 'fair or substantial basis' in state law." Id. Non-procedural
grounds for decision-such as state constitutional grounds providing protections
similar to those in the U.S. Constitution-may also be considered adequate and
independent grounds for a state court decision regarding a question of federal law. Id.
at 76 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)).
83. Adams, 520 U.S. at 91.
84. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 25, at 928 ("The history of habeas corpus has
been vehemently debated and voluminously written about .....
85. Wilner, supra note 2, at 1445 & n.21.
86. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
87. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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any treaty or law of the United States."88 This expansion of the writ to
include state prisoners heralded the change and development of the
writ that occurred during Reconstruction.89
In 1886, Justice Harlan revealed the Court's interpretation of the
"true extent of the act of 1867. "90 In his decision for the Court on a
state prisoner's habeas petition, he held that the federal courts had
jurisdiction to review state court decisions on habeas review.91
Further, Justice Harlan concluded that it was up to the federal court
to determine the "time and mode" of their review of any criminal
claim arising in state court that involved a constitutional or federal
question.92 Despite this generally broad view of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to review state court decisions on habeas review, the
Court remained sensitive to Congress's concerns that any of the lower
federal courts not act as a "statutorily mandated 'court of errors"'
over the states' highest courts.93 To address these concerns, Justice
Harlan noted that the "mode" and "timing" of federal review should,
as in a writ of error, only take place after "the State court[s] shall have
finally acted upon the case."'94 Still, the writ of habeas corpus
remained an option for state prisoners to challenge the
constitutionality of their criminal sentences throughout the late
nineteenth century, though the Court typically provided habeas
review only in cases where a prisoner could not file a writ of error for
direct review by the Court itself.95 The Court seemed to abandon this
preference in the early twentieth century.96
The modern history of habeas law is sometimes said to begin in
1953, when the Court, in Brown v. Allen, significantly broadened the
scope of habeas review by establishing a standard of review to be used
by federal courts in evaluating habeas petitions.9' Brown marked the
88. Ch. 27, 14 Stat. at 385.
89. See Yackle, supra note 2, at 30.
90. See Liebman, supra note 25, at 2069 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886); see also Liebman, supra note 25, at
2069.
92. Royall, 117 U.S. at 251.
93. See Liebman, supra note 25, at 2069 (quoting Royall, 117 U.S. at 253).
94. Royall, 117 U.S. at 253; see also Liebman, supra note 25, at 2069 (discussing
Justice Harlan's Royall opinion, and specifically his attempts to balance giving the
federal courts discretion in reviewing federal claims first heard in state courts with the
Congress's desire that the federal system not be given too much power over the state
judiciaries).
95. See Liebman, supra note 25, at 2071.
96. See id. at 2077.
97. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see also Patrick E. Higginbotham,
Reflections on Reform of § 2254 Habeas Petitions, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 1005, 1008
(1990) ("The modem history of habeas law dates from the Supreme Court's 1953
decision in Brown v. Allen."); Wilner, supra note 2, at 1445-46 (noting that the Brown
Court explicitly established that state prisoners were to receive de novo review of




culmination of an expansion of the writ that had been building since
1867.98 Legally, Brown altered the power of the federal judiciary to
review state court decisions by specifically stating the standard of
review a habeas review court was to apply.99 Prior to Brown, the
federal habeas review courts were allowed to review any federal claim
de novo so long as the prisoner exhausted his state claims prior to
bringing them in the federal system.1°° The Court in Brown held that,
for purposes of federal review of state habeas petitions, the standard
of review would depend on whether a habeas claim involved questions
of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of law and fact.'01 Under
Brown, on habeas review, questions of law and mixed questions of law
and fact received de novo review by federal habeas review courts, and
questions of fact were presumed to be correct.02 A petitioner could,
however, rebut that presumption through a showing of clear and
convincing evidence. 03
The period leading up to the Brown decision ushered in a change in
the purpose and scope of the writ. Habeas's earliest form differed
both in scope and in significance from its current form." Early in its
history, habeas was primarily used to challenge the legality of
executive detentions such as denials of bail or warrantless arrests.0 5
In recent years, habeas has become a means for relitigating federal
constitutional claims from not only state detentions, but state criminal
convictions as well. 106 The writ currently allows federal courts to
order a new trial for state prisoners whose incarceration violates
98. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 263-65; Higginbothan, supra note 97, at 1008.
99. See Wilner, supra note 2, at 1446 & n.22.
100. See id. at 1447-48 (interpreting this to allow "a broad, expansive review in the
federal courts as long as the state courts had an opportunity to decide an issue first").
Other commentators, though, have interpreted the pre-Brown standard of review to
have been much more limiting to state prisoners. Cf Yackle, supra note 2, at 42-43.
Yackle interprets the pre-Brown approach to federal review of state court decisions
to
put an end to federal habeas corpus for state convicts: All states offered
convicts some means for addressing federal claims, and prisoners were often
entitled to seek relief from state courts over and over again (albeit with no
hope of success after the first attempt). Since there was never a time when
state process was unavailable, there was never a time when prisoners could
file habeas petitions in federal court.
Id. at 42-43; see also Hon. John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8
F.R.D. 171, 176-77 (1949) (discussing reasons for and against including specific
language requiring petitioners to exhaust their state remedies in the habeas statute).
101. Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for "Reasonably
Erroneous" Applications of Federal Law, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 731, 735-36 (2002).
102. See id. at 735-36.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000); see also Pettys, supra note 101, at 736 (noting
that both before and following Brown findings of fact by state courts "are rebuttably
presumed to be correct").
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federal law." 7 The writ of habeas corpus applies to situations where
errors in state court proceedings "undermine[d] confidence in the
fundamental fairness of the state adjudication.' 08
After Brown, critics of federal review of state habeas corpus
petitions attacked this new standard of review.0 9 That is, commentary
was commonly based on a feeling that de novo review by federal
courts of state court decisions did not provide an appropriate balance
of concern for finality, comity, and federalism with protection of
prisoners' interests in fairness and justice.110 The Brown Court's
standard of review continues to apply to any habeas petition that does
not fall within the new AEDPA standards."' And so the role of the
federal judiciary in evaluating state court decisions is still important to
and discussed in the case law today.
Even though the AEDPA legislation altered the scope of federal
courts' habeas review power and the analysis applied to habeas
petitions, theoretical questions about the goals and problems of
habeas continue to dominate scholarly debate in much the same way
such larger questions dominate scholarship about judicial review,"2
and direct Supreme Court review in particular." 3  For example,
federal review of state court determinations of federal law is often
claimed to conflict with state sovereignty. Article III of the U.S.
Constitution identifies the federal judiciary as the final authority in
questions of federal law, and the Supremacy Clause recognizes federal
law as the supreme law of the land." 4 Nevertheless, states are bound
to enforce federal law, and "principles of comity and federalism"
suggest that their decisions receive some deference." 5 In addition,
some critics of habeas review believe such review damages the judicial
system's goal of promoting finality in court proceedings by allowing
unnecessary relitigation of otherwise final convictions." 6  In
particular, critics argue that habeas review decreases states' ability to
107. See Dodson, supra note 6, at 225.
108. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000).
109. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 25, at 271 ("Critics identify tensions caused by
federal review of state criminal decisions and present those tensions as justification
for cutting back the broad reach of habeas."); Steinman, supra note 40, at 1497-98
(providing a pro-defendant view of the impact of Brown but also noting that "some
criticized Brown as allowing unwarranted relitigation of otherwise final state
convictions").
110. See Wilner, supra note 2, at 1446-47.
111. AEDPA imposes a variety of new restrictions on the types of claims a federal
habeas review court may hear. See infra Part I.C.2.
112. See Farber, supra note 41, at 417-19.
113. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
114. See Dodson, supra note 6, at 224-25; Yackle, supra note 22, at 118; see also
supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing more generally some of the
questions of federalism that arise when thinking about federal judicial review of state
court decisions).
115. Dodson, supra note 6, at 225.
116. See Wilner, supra note 2, at 1447.
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enforce their own criminal laws and punish their own citizens who
break those laws.117
2. AEDPA and the "Adjudicated on the Merits" Requirement
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,"1 passed in
1996, is the most recent alteration to habeas regulations. Congress
passed AEDPA in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, and the
legislation's primary focus was on "fighting terrorism both at home
and abroad."'1 9 In fact, the vast majority of the Act is devoted to
creating for law enforcement officers "tough new tools to stop
terrorists before they strike and to bring them to justice if they do." 2°
Included in this legislation, though, was a short section intended to
"streamline Federal appeals for convicted criminals sentenced to the
death penalty."'2 AEDPA created a new section of the habeas
corpus statute that applies only to death penalty cases, requiring that
defendants facing the death penalty receive competent counsel.122
The legislation amended the rest of the habeas statute as well. Most
important to this Note's analysis, AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), the statute regulating federal review of habeas petitions
submitted by state prisoners.123
The section of the amended statute at issue here is 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), which Congress amended in section 104(3) of AEDPA. The
statute is divided into three parts. The first section (section (d) below)
provides federal habeas courts with criteria for determining which
habeas petitions should be considered under the new standard. The
two subparts (sections (d)(1) and (d)(2) below) establish what that
new, stricter standard should be. The statute states:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim-
117. See id.
118. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
119. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, in 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William
J. Clinton 630, 630 (1997).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke L.J. 1, 25 n.151 (1997) (discussing some of the
additional requirements the AEDPA imposes on states in order to ensure defendants
facing the death penalty receive competent counsel for any post-conviction
proceedings).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.1
2 4
This section of AEDPA's amendments to habeas law has been
referred to as the "key element of the 1996 reform of habeas
corpus.'125 According to some, the effect of the congressional changes
to the habeas statute was to officially enact into law the changes
already incorporated into habeas procedure and jurisprudence by the
federal judiciary.26 By its terms, the statute creates a new, deferential
standard with which federal habeas review courts must treat state
court decisions on the federal issues raised in habeas petitions. 27 The
goal of this deference was to decrease the number of habeas petitions
flooding the federal system. 28 Importantly, the AEDPA limitations
have not had this desired effect; instead there has been an increase in
124. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).
125. Scheidegger, supra note 25, at 945.
126. See Yackle, supra note 2, at 56 ("[T]he Act's genuine purpose [was] to endorse
and reinforce many of the Court's own efforts to curb the writ ...."); Tushnet &
Yackle, supra note 122, at 21 (noting that "[tlhe fact that the courts had already done
most of what the Republican legislation [including AEDPA] sought to accomplish
was largely irrelevant from a politician's point of view"). Tushnet and Yackle also
note that AEDPA was politically popular "even if it accomplished little as a matter of
law." Id. at 21; see also Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great
Writ of Liberty 153 (2001) ("The Court has read AEDPA as a Congressional decision
to accomplish its purpose of speeding up habeas litigation by rewriting the procedural
rules while making no fundamental alteration in the existing role of the federal courts
in inquiring into state capital convictions."). However, others disagree with this
characterization of AEDPA as only minimally affecting habeas corpus. In particular,
the Supreme Court rejected this view in Williams v. Taylor. 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)
(O'Connor, J., concurring, but delivering the opinion of the Court for Part II (except
as to the footnote)) ("It cannot be disputed that Congress viewed § 2254(d)(1) as an
important means by which its goals for habeas reform would be achieved.").
Importantly, in stating that Congress intended to alter the scope of habeas corpus,
Justice O'Connor focused on the changes Congress made to the standard of review to
be applied once it is clear a state prisoner's claim has been "adjudicated on the
merits" by the state court. Id. The Court in Williams did not discuss the meaning of
"adjudicated on the merits" in the AEDPA statute.
127. For example, Kent Scheidegger points to the floor debates in both houses
during the passage of AEDPA, and observes that every member who spoke on the
issue called the new habeas statute "a 'deference' standard." Scheidegger, supra note
25, at 945. This view of the AEDPA amendments has led to much discussion in the
courts about the level of deference federal habeas review courts should give the
decisions of state courts on federal questions. See infra notes 150-52.
128. U.S. Department of Justice, Prisoner Petitions Filed in U.S. District Courts,
2000, with Trends 1980-2000, at 3 (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf.
2612 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
habeas petitions filed by state prisoners following the 1996 enactment
of AEDPA.
129
A key passage of the statutory language, as amended by AEDPA, is
the phrase "adjudicated on the merits.""13 According to the statutory
language, a federal court reviewing a habeas claim must first question
whether the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court
before it can apply the two subsections of the statute. 131 The
implications of this determination are significant: If a claim was
"adjudicated on the merits" by the state court, the AEDPA standard
of review, and its limitations to the types of cases a court may
consider, will apply. 132 Accordingly, the federal habeas review court
may grant the habeas petition only if the case as tried in the state
court system falls into one of the two subsections provided under
AEDPA's 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). The strict terms of these
subsections significantly limit the ability of prisoners to challenge their
state convictions, and the federal habeas review court is required to
give significant deference to a state court decision regarding any
federal question.'33
In contrast, if the claim was not "adjudicated on the merits," the
circuits agree that a federal court should apply the pre-AEDPA
129. Id. at 1, 4 (noting that there has been a 50% increase in the number of habeas
petitions filed by state prisoners).
130. The question of how to interpret "adjudicated on the merits" is important not
only to the determination by federal courts of the standard of review to be applied to
prior state court decisions regarding the federal claim at issue. In addition, it plays an
important role in current debate over the "meaning and role of habeas corpus in the
criminal process, the perceived abuse of the writ by convicted criminals, and ... the
role of federal courts in state proceedings" more generally. William P. Welty,
Comment, "Adjudication on the Merits" Under the AEDPA, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 900,
904-05 (2003).
131. The practical effect of this determination is that it informs habeas review
courts of the standard of review they are to apply to state court decisions on questions
of federal law. See, e.g., Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 229 (2d Cir. 2003); Aycox v.
Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1999); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274
(5th Cir. 1999).
132. See Cotto, 331 F.3d at 229 ("[T]he standard governing federal habeas review
depends on whether petitioner's claim has been previously 'adjudicated on the merits'
by a state court."). The Cotto court also noted that "'[t]he necessary predicate to
[AEDPA's] deferential review [of the state court decision] is, of course, that
petitioner's federal claim has been 'adjudicated on the merits' by the state court." Id.
at 230 (quoting Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Fourth Circuit
stated that "because [petitioner's] ... claim was adjudicated on the merits by the ...
state court, our review is limited by the deferential standard of review set forth in §
2254(d)." Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 157 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Fortini v.
Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2001) ("AEDPA's strict standard of review only
applies to a 'claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings."'
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))).
133. See, e.g., Fortini, 257 F.3d at 47 (calling the AEDPA standard of review
"strict"); Bell, 236 F.3d at 157 (calling the AEDPA standard of review "deferential").
In addition, the Supreme Court interpreted the two prongs of AEDPA review, §
2254(d)(1) and (2), in Williams v. Taylor. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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standard of review to the claim.'34 Upon determination that a claim
was not "adjudicated on the merits" by the state court system, a
federal habeas review court will evaluate questions of law and mixed
questions of law and fact de novo. Therefore, the federal court will
not apply the increased deference to state court decisions required by
the amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 35
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has established any clear
explanation or interpretation of "adjudicated on the merits," and the
circuit courts currently disagree as to how the federal courts should
apply the "adjudicated on the merits" requirement in their habeas
review analyses.136 Part II discusses the circuits' different views of the
definition and the implications of the dispute.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNRESOLVED STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Since being amended by AEDPA in 1996, the habeas statute has
been the source of controversy and discussion among scholars and in
the federal habeas review courts as they struggle to interpret and
apply what has been called a statute "notorious for its poor
drafting." '137 Analysis of the Act's legislative history provides little
insight into Congress's intended application in practice, except to
indicate that Congress sought to narrow the scope of habeas review to
reduce delays in achieving finality in criminal cases.'38 The lack of
134. See, e.g., Cotto, 331 F.3d at 230 ("If a state court has not adjudicated the claim
'on the merits,' we apply the pre-AEDPA standards, and review de novo the state
court disposition of the petitioner's federal constitutional claims."); McKenzie v.
Smith, 326 F.3d 721, 726 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1145 (2004). Under
pre-AEDPA habeas review, questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact
received de novo review, and questions of fact were presumed to be correct, though a
petitioner could rebut the presumption through a showing of clear and convincing
evidence.
135. See supra notes 132, 134 and accompanying text.
136. See Monique Anne Gaylor, Note, Postcards From The Bench: Federal Habeas
Review of Unarticulated State Court Decisions, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 1262, 1283 (2003)
("The Supreme Court has yet to directly address the issue of what quantum of
articulated analysis is necessary to qualify a state court opinion for review under §
2254(d)(1)."); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra Part II.
137. Yackle, supra note 2, at 57. In fact, in Lindh v. Murphy, which addressed the
retroactivity portions of AEDPA, Justice Souter discussed the Act's entire chapter
devoted to amending the habeas law. 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). He noted that "in a
world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory
drafting." Id.; see also infra Part II.A. (discussing the controversy between circuits as
to how to interpret § 2254(d) under AEDPA).
138. See Carrie M. Bowden, The Need for Comity: A Proposal for Federal Court
Review of Suppression Issues in the Dual Sovereignty Context After the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 214-15 (2003).
Bowden goes on to describe the legislative history of what she calls the "deference
provisions." Id. at 223. According to the record of the floor debate, the resulting
legislation was the product of a hard-fought compromise between Senators Kyl and
Hatch, who both seemed to be advocating for such strict limits to habeas that the
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statutory language and little, if any, legislative guidance, opens the
door to inconsistent interpretation among the circuits regarding which
state court decisions constitute an "adjudication on the merits." Not
surprisingly, the circuit courts are inconsistent in reviewing seemingly
similar habeas petitions. A federal habeas petition may be considered
"adjudicated on the merits" in one circuit, requiring application of the
stricter AEDPA provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2), to the
federal court's review of that petition, while another circuit may
consider a similar petition not adjudicated on the merits, rendering the
pre-AEDPA standard of review applicable to that petition. This part
discusses the disagreement among the circuits and attempts to clarify
some of the ways in which this disagreement results in inconsistent
treatment for individual petitioners.
A. The Circuit Split
Determination of whether a state court "adjudicated" a federal
question "on the merits" is far less obvious and straightforward than it
may seem. As a result, the circuit courts disagree as to how to define
and apply "adjudicated on the merits" in practice, especially when a
state court rules on a state prisoner's federal claim but does not
mention that claim or any applicable federal law in its opinion. Some
circuit courts have held that any non-procedural resolution of a
federal claim in state court should be considered an adjudication "on
the merits.' 1 39 Other circuits disagree with this approach, and look to
the actual decision by the state court to ensure that the state court
discussed the federal claim and stated the federal law applicable to the
claim. 4°
To understand how this situation arises in practice, recall the
legislation would eliminate habeas review for state prisoners entirely, and Senator
Biden, who advocated for elimination of deference language entirely. Id. at 223-25.
Senator Hatch, noted that the intended result of his proposed language was to
simply end[] the improper review of State court decisions. After all, State
courts are required to uphold the Constitution and to faithfully apply
Federal laws. There is simply no reason that Federal courts should have the
ability to virtually retry cases that have been properly adjudicated by our
State courts.
Id. at 226 (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S3447 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)). In its final version, the statute does not mention the word deference at all.
28 U.S.C. 2254(d). And President Clinton, in his remarks at the signing of the bill,
emphasized that he "ha[d] signed th[e] bill because [he was] confident that the
Federal courts [would] interpret these provisions to preserve independent review of
Federal legal claims and the bedrock constitutional principle of an independent
judiciary." Clinton, supra note 119, at 631. Clinton then went on to say that the
section of the bill codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) "would be subject to serious
constitutional challenge if it were read to preclude the Federal courts from making an
independent determination about 'what the law is' in cases within their jurisdiction."
Id.
139. See infra Part II.A.1.
140. See infra Part II.A.2.
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hypothetical prisoner introduced at the beginning of this Note, and
the three possible decisions the state court might have handed
down.' First, the state appellate court may address the petitioner's
Sixth Amendment challenge specifically and provide relevant federal
precedent in denying the claim. Second, the state appellate court may
issue an opinion that mentions the claim but provides no reasoning for
its decision. And third, a state court may discuss several of a
petitioner's claims in varying levels of detail, but completely fail to
mention the petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim at all.
As demonstrated in Part I, the way the federal judiciary interprets
"adjudicated on the merits" informs the standard of review applied in
evaluating state prisoners' federal habeas petitions in the different
situations discussed above. Thus, where a state court clearly mentions
a petitioner's federal claim and also discusses its reasoning for
resolving the claim, the circuits agree that the claim has been
"adjudicated on the merits.' 14 2 The federal habeas review court must
then apply the AEDPA standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and
(2).143 Under AEDPA, the federal habeas review court may only
consider a claim that was adjudicated on the merits if it falls into one
of those two narrow categories noted in the statute, a much stricter
standard of review than in pre-AEDPA federal review.1" As Judge
Calabresi has put it,
where a habeas petitioner's claims have received an "adjudicat[ion]
on the merits" and, as a result of that adjudication, have been
rejected by a State court, the AEDPA commands that federal courts
yield to the state court decision, and do so even in some instances
where that decision is legally incorrect. Federal courts must do this
rather than undertake an independent, de novo review of the claim's
merits.145
In this concurring opinion, Judge Calabresi captured the impact of the
141. See supra Introduction.
142. Where a state discusses the federal law it considered and how that law applied
to the facts of the case at hand, the federal review court may easily determine that the
federal claim was "adjudicated on the merits," and thus the AEDPA standard of
review would apply. See Glidden, supra note 6, at 182.
143. See, e.g., Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 157 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (where
defendant's federal claim is "adjudicated on the merits by the ... state court, our
review is limited by the deferential standard of review set forth in § 2254(d)").
144. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court clarified how
§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) apply to state petitioners' habeas claims in Williams v. Taylor.
529 U.S. 362 (2000). There, in a divided opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court only in Section II of the opinion, which provided definitions for both the
"contrary to" and "unreasonable application" prongs of subsection (1) of the statute
and further clarified application of subsection (2). Id. at 409-13. Justice Stevens wrote
for the Court as to the rest of the opinion, however neither addressed how federal
courts were to interpret the "adjudicated on the merits" provision of the statute. Id. at
367-99




AEDPA amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): to demand federal
deference to state court decisions, but only once it is clear the state
had the opportunity to, and actually did, "adjudicate" a federal claim
"on the merits."
It may seem that where the state court is completely silent as to a
federal claim, it should be clear that the claim was not "adjudicated on
the merits." However, in situations both where a state court is
completely silent or where the state court provides only a nominal or
perfunctory mention of a petitioner's properly presented federal
claim, the circuits do not agree on how to interpret "adjudicated on
the merits." In these cases, the circuit courts fall into two general
factions.
146
1. Majority View: A Decision Is Enough
The majority of circuits are results-focused: Where a state court has
based its decision on non-procedural grounds, and has issued a
judgment, that claim has been "adjudicated on the merits." '147 Thus, a
state court decision may be an "adjudication on the merits" even
where the state court has barely mentioned the federal issue, let alone
identified the federal law it used to resolve the issue.14 A claim would
even be "adjudicated on the merits" where it was raised in the state
court even if the state court never mentioned it.14 9 Under this view,
courts seem to skip analysis of whether a state claim was "adjudicated
on the merits" and focus on a discussion and determination of the
standard of review, or level of deference, they should apply to the
state court decision. 150
146. The Second Circuit provided a good overview of these different views in
Washington v. Schriver; however, it declined to decide which approach the Second
Circuit would follow in that case. Id. at 53-55. In addition to the two general factions,
the Sixth Circuit falls in the middle, and seems to still be working through its
formulation of how to define "adjudicated on the merits." See infra Part II.C.
147. See, e.g., Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001); Neal v. Puckett,
239 F.3d 683, 686, 696 (5th Cir. 2001) (defining "adjudication on the merits" to be "a
term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case was substantive as
opposed to procedural"); Bell, 236 F.3d at 158-59; Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an "adjudication on the merits" is a substantive, rather
than a procedural, resolution of a federal claim, and that a federal court must apply
AEDPA deference to the result of a state court decision, even if the reasoning is not
expressly stated).
148. See Steinman, supra note 40, at 1510-11; Welty, supra note 130, at 913.
149. See, e.g., Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312 (holding that a federal habeas review court
must follow the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2) even where the
state court does not mention the federal claim or federal law in its opinion); Aycox,
196 F.3d at 1177 (holding that federal habeas courts are to consider the "result" of a
state court's evaluation of a federal claim in determining whether the claim was
"adjudicated on the merits," rather than the state court's application of the relevant
federal law).
150. The Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor also failed to explain how the
federal courts were to apply the "unreasonable application" evaluation required by
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For example, the Second Circuit explained that where the state
court has not decided a federal claim on procedural grounds, the
"federal habeas court must defer... to the state court's decision on
the federal claim-even if the state court does not explicitly refer to
either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law." '' The Tenth
Circuit agreed, holding that the federal habeas review court "owe[s]
deference to the state court's result, even if its reasoning is not
expressly stated. 152  The Tenth Circuit's discussion of deference
exemplifies the confusion the AEDPA amendments have caused
regarding the standard of review federal habeas review courts are to
apply to state court decisions. The Tenth Circuit made this statement
in Aycox v. Lytle while discussing the question of whether the
defendant's claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, and
yet its focus was on the deference federal habeas review courts were
to give a state court decision that did "not articulate a reasoned
application of federal law to determined facts." '53 The Aycox court
did not provide an answer as to how to interpret the phrase
"adjudicated on the merits.' 5 4
Even though the courts seem to confuse the question of
"adjudicated on the merits" with the interpretation of the standard of
review to be applied under AEDPA to cases that were "adjudicated
on the merits," some have articulated tests they use in determining if a
claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in the state court. The Second
Circuit considers a claim adjudicated on the merits when a state court
"(1) disposes of the claim 'on the merits,' and (2) reduces its
disposition to judgment.""15 The Fifth Circuit has also developed a
test to determine if a state court's decision is "on the merits."' 56 That
test requires consideration of
(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2) whether the
history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any
ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and (3) whether
subsection (1) to a state court decision that was either silent as to the reasoning
regarding a federal claim, or where the state court provided only a perfunctory
opinion such as, "the claim is without merit." See Pettys, supra note 101, at 732, 735-
36. As a result, lower courts confuse consideration of whether a silent or perfunctory
state court decision was "adjudicated on the merits" with the question of how to
determine if § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" prong applies to those same
decisions. This Note's analysis is limited to only the question of how to define
"adjudicated on the merits" in a way that answers the question of whether a silent or
perfunctory state court decision was "adjudicated on the merits." In some cases,
however, the analyses overlap.
151. Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312.
152. Aycox, 196 F.3d at 1177.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 230 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
156. Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1999).
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the state court's opinion suggests reliance upon procedural grounds
rather than a determination on the merits.157
This test provides some guidance to lower federal courts in evaluating
a state court opinion to determine whether it did "adjudicate" a
federal claim "on the merits." It encourages the federal court to look
at the case record, at similar cases in the state, or at the procedural
posture of the case. 5 ' However, the test seems to restate the obvious
without providing any actual criteria for a federal court to follow. For
example, the test fails to clarify how the federal court should proceed
if a state's courts typically provide only silent or perfunctory opinions
on questions of federal law. Indeed, a federal court should not give
that state's findings AEDPA deference simply because it is the
general practice of the state.
In justifying the view that basically any judgment by a state court
other than a denial on procedural grounds should be considered
"adjudicated on the merits," this majority group of circuits often
points to principles of federalism and respect for the state court
decisions. For example, the Fourth Circuit stated that even in a case
where the state court's decision is a summary order, the federal review
court may not assume that order "is indicative of a cursory or
haphazard review of [the] petitioner's claims." '159 Instead, the court
noted that even such a summary order is still an "adjudication on the
merits."" Therefore, the order must be "reviewed under the
deferential provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)."' 6'
Other courts look to the statutory language to justify their view of
"adjudicated on the merits." The Seventh Circuit, for example,
defended its definition of "adjudicated on the merits" by reasoning
that "[n]othing in Section 2254(d) calls on state courts to fill their
opinions with discussions that by their lights are unnecessary," just to
157. Id. This test was adopted by the Second Circuit in Sellan v. Kuhlman. 261 F.3d
303, 314 (2d Cir. 2001).
158. Importantly, the third clause of the test seems to point federal courts toward
the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine and allows them to forgive a
silent or perfunctory state opinion on those grounds. See supra note 82 for a general
description of the doctrine.
159. Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
160. Id.
161. Id. This case also illustrates the confusion regarding the order of analysis
required under AEDPA and § 2254(d). The court focused its analysis on how a silent
or summary state judgment would affect the federal court's ability to determine
whether the state court's decision constituted an "unreasonable application" of
federal law. Id. However, the plain language of the statute would require a state
court to have adjudicated a claim on the merits regardless of which prong of § 2254(d)
the federal court was then to consider. It is possible that the circuits that confuse this
issue do so because they believe any non-procedural state court decision is a decision
on the merits, and therefore AEDPA and the limits of § 2254(d)(1) or (2) would
always apply. Thus, they seem to believe that they can ignore whether a state court
adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits for purposes of determining which
standard of review to apply to that state court's decision.
2618 [Vol. 72
ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS
ensure the federal habeas review court will apply the post-AEDPA §
2254(d)(1) and (2)-a significantly narrower set of claims that may be
reviewed-as opposed to the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of review
for any federal claim raised.162 The majority of circuits, then, promote
application of the post-AEDPA deferential standard of review to any
state court decision that included a federal claim, so long as that
federal claim was not dismissed on procedural or state-law grounds.
2. The Minority View: The Reasoning Is Important, Too
The First and Third Circuits, on the other hand, hold that a state
court decision is not "adjudicated on the merits" unless there is some
indication that the state court applied federal law in reaching its
result.163 This view is sometimes called an opinion-focused approach
because habeas relief is limited only where the state court opinion
includes both a correct interpretation of the federal law and its
reasonable application to the facts of the case at hand."6
These circuit courts typically will not assume consideration of the
merits by a state court absent some evidence. For example, the First
Circuit held that "[i]n the absence of reasoning on a holding from the
state court on the issue, we cannot say the claim was 'adjudicated on
the merits' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) .... '[W]e can
hardly defer to the state court on an issue that the state court did not
address."' 65  Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that "when,
although properly preserved by the defendant, the state court has not
reached the merits of a claim thereafter presented to a federal habeas
court, the deferential standards provided by AEDPA and explained in
Williams do not apply."'66 Thus, these circuits apply the post-AEDPA
deferential standard of review only to those state courts that discuss
both a petitioner's federal claim and the federal law considered in
analyzing the claim.
3. The Middle Ground
The Sixth Circuit is more closely aligned with the majority view; it
strays, however, in its treatment of state court opinions that are
absolutely silent as to the federal claim. 167 Where a state court issued
162. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 874 (7th Cir. 1996).
163. See Glidden, supra note 6, at 185.
164. See Steinman, supra note 40, at 1510.
165. Brown v. Maloney, 267 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 961
(2002) (quoting Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2001)); see also Fryar v.
Bissonette, 185 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[W]hen a federal claim is
properly presented to the state appellate court but not addressed by that court, the
unreviewed federal claim must be considered de novo by the reviewing federal
court.").
166. Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
167. Welty, supra note 130, at 919.
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a summary order, the district court will apply AEDPA and the limits
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2), as the majority of circuits do,
because it "can safely assume that the state court considered the
merits" of a petitioner's claim. 16 The Sixth Circuit does not, however,
require the state court's opinion to include an "extended
discussion. ' 169  In contrast, where there are "no results, let alone
reasoning" in a state court opinion, the Sixth Circuit-unlike the
majority of the circuits-will apply pre-AEDPA analysis. 7 ° That is,
the court will "exercise [its] independent judgment and review the
claim de novo."' 17 1 The Sixth Circuit, in taking this middle ground,
attempts to strike a balance that allows the state courts to provide
only limited reference to a federal claim, but still requires that it make
some mention of the federal claim and federal law. Thus, the state
court may issue a perfunctory judgment but not a silent one.
B. Getting Lost in the Standard of Review
The disagreement among the circuit courts depends on a view of
habeas as an independent process within the criminal justice system.
Indeed, most discussion about application of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as
amended by AEDPA, focuses on the courts' confusion over the
standard of review that federal habeas review courts are to apply in
cases where a state court provides only summary opinions or where
the state court is silent.'72 Understandably, then, the circuit courts
have focused their respective arguments for their interpretation of
"adjudicated on the merits" on an attempt to identify the standard of
review the federal courts are to apply to state court decisions in
reviewing habeas petitions. As a result, many seem to miss the actual
question at hand: whether the claim was actually "adjudicated on the
merits" in state court. AEDPA does alter the standard of review to
apply to state court decisions for purposes of habeas review under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).173 However, the approach of the majority
of circuits places the cart before the horse: A court must first
determine whether the claim being reviewed was "adjudicated on the
merits," and only then will it apply some standard of review.174
168. McKenzie v. Smith, 326 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 326 F.3d
721 (2003).
169. Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
170. McKenzie, 326 F.3d at 727 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
171. Id. (internal citations omitted).
172. Much of the scholarly commentary surrounding this question focuses on the
standard of review and tends to argue that it should be de novo for silent or summary
state court decisions. See infra note 177.
173. See supra notes 13, 133 and accompanying text.
174. How to interpret and apply AEDPA's revised standard of review is also an
important area of study. It is, however, a separate question from the one presented in
this Note-a distinction many of the current cases and commentaries on the subject
seem to ignore.
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This confusion in the order of analysis creates a particular problem
in cases where a state court barely mentions a federal claim or fails to
mention it at all. A counter-intuitive result may occur where federal
courts end up deferring to nothing. If the AEDPA amendments were
intended to alter the standard of review federal courts should apply to
every habeas petition, federal courts may ignore a potentially
important federal claim regardless of whether the state court actually
addressed that claim, simply because they are attempting to accord
deference to the state court. That cannot be the purpose of setting the
qualifications as to which claims should be deferred to, as AEDPA
does.'75 This is especially true given that habeas review is simply a
part of the greater judicial framework that emphasizes uniform and
fair application of federal law.'76
Thus the controversy surrounding the split between the circuits
presents only part of the problem. Part III attempts to resolve this
controversy by looking neither at the actual standard of review to be
applied, nor at the legislative history of the specific AEDPA
provisions as much of the commentary does. 177  Instead, Part III
175. The plain language of the statute indicates that the phrase "adjudicated on the
merits" qualifies which claims are to receive the AEDPA standard of review rather
than the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2002); see
also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting as to Part 1I)
("A construction of AEDPA that would require the federal courts to cede [their
authority to interpret federal law] to the courts of the States would be inconsistent
with the practice that federal judges have traditionally followed in discharging their
duties under Article III of the Constitution.").
176. See supra notes 51, 75 and accompanying text.
177. Much commentary about the meaning of or interpretation of "adjudicated on
the merits" under § 2254(d) encourages federal habeas review courts to apply a de
novo (and thus pre-AEDPA) standard of review to state court decisions that are
either perfunctory or silent. While this Note agrees with this general interpretation of
"adjudicated on the merits," the justification for that interpretation focuses on taking
a broader view of habeas corpus and thus does not address many of the analytical
bases these commentators rely on. As many of these arguments are compelling, and
provide additional support for the view expressed in this Note, a sampling of them is
outlined briefly here.
First, much discussion surrounds the policy goals of habeas corpus as an
independent process within the criminal justice system, and focuses on the need for
habeas to strike a balance between maximizing state judicial independence and the
need for finality but at the same time protecting individuals' constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Dodson, supra note 6, at 239-41 (providing a different view of "adjudicated on
the merits" than the other commentators but basing his discussion on similar policy
concerns); Gaylor, supra note 136, at 1289-91; Glidden, supra note 6, at 199-200;
Welty, supra note 130, at 924; Wilner, supra note 2, at 1473-74. A second area of
analysis in interpreting "adjudicated on the merits" focuses on the legislative history
and intent of the Congress that enacted AEDPA. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 6, at
238; Glidden, supra note 6, at 208-10; Welty, supra note 130, at 925; Wilner, supra
note 2, at 1459-60. Many commentators also look to the statutory language as a basis
for explaining their interpretation of "adjudicated on the merits." See, e.g., Dodson,
supra note 6, at 230-35; Glidden, supra note 6, at 205-08; Wilner, supra note 2, at 1473.
Finally, some analysis focuses on the Supreme Court and its likely interpretation of
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discusses habeas corpus as part of the appellate function of the federal
judiciary. In light of this approach, Part III then compares the use of
"adjudicated on the merits" as a condition imposed on state court
decisions for purposes of habeas review with use of the "addressed by,
or properly presented to" condition imposed on state court decisions
for purposes of direct Supreme Court review.'78 Based on this
comparison, Part III concludes that "adjudicated on the merits" must
be defined to mean that federal habeas review courts, in their
appellate role, must only provide AEDPA deference to state court
decisions that actually mention and reasonably rely on federal law.
III. THE BEST VIEW: A DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK FOR ALLOWING
AEDPA DEFERENCE ONLY WHERE THE STATE HAS SPOKEN
A. Similar Definition, Different Approach
Part II introduced the existing controversy among the various
circuit courts over how to interpret and apply "adjudicated on the
merits" within the context of federal habeas review of state court
decisions, and introduced a misplaced focus on the level of deference
federal courts should give to state court decisions. This part argues
that a better approach to understanding the application of
"adjudicated on the merits" to the habeas review process is to view
habeas within the larger context of federal judicial review power over
state court decisions. Within that framework, the writ of habeas
corpus is an appeal that is available for review of certain constitutional
errors made in adjudications by state courts and may therefore be
compared to the Supreme Court's ability to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction on direct review.179 Some even consider habeas review to
"adjudicated on the merits" based on its approach in other habeas corpus cases. See,
e.g., Glidden, supra note 6, at 210-14; Gaylor, supra note 136, at 1283-85.
Some scholars also analyze "adjudicated on the merits" by comparing it to use
of the same phrase for purposes of res judicata. See Dodson, supra note 6, at 232 n.48
(noting that while some courts, such as the Second Circuit, have "intimated that
'adjudicated on the merits' is a term of art which, whether used in the habeas corpus
statute or in the law of res judicata, encompasses summary dispositions on the
merits"). Dodson notes, however, that this argument is "shaky" for a variety of
reasons, noting specifically that "courts have considered, and uniformly discarded, an
interpretation of habeas corpus review that engenders state court decisions with res
judicata effect on federal courts." Id.
178. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
179. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 329-30 (noting that his view of habeas, "in
which the habeas court is a surrogate for Supreme Court review, and.., procedural
rules governing access to habeas mirror those governing access to Supreme Court
review," is a better and more straightforward way for courts to view habeas);
Hoffstadt, supra note 4, at 993-98 (providing an overview of the "appellate model of
habeas," which is "[g]rounded in legal pragmatism" and focuses on "how the federal
habeas writ actually functions in the courts"); Liebman, supra note 25, at 2055-56
(discussing view of habeas as an appellate procedure and noting that "[a]s a substitute
for federal direct appeal, habeas corpus has never duplicated, but has always mirrored
2004] ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS 2623
be a surrogate for the overburdened Supreme Court, which cannot
provide direct review to all criminal cases that might merit additional
review."' Thus, federal courts should look to the process by which a
state case may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on direct review to
better understand how to best interpret and apply the "adjudicated on
the merits" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 181
B. Creating the Comparison: Habeas as an Appellate Function of the
Federal Courts
Habeas plays a vital role in a long-running conversation about
congressional power over federal court jurisdiction.82 The debate
raises the question of how much freedom Congress should have in
shaping the dimensions and scope of habeas.'83 Indeed, there are
some who believe that an increasingly restrictive view of habeas by
Congress and by the Court damages, rather than preserves, the
federal system and the notions of individual civil rights that are the
foundation of our criminal justice system."8 Thus, the role habeas
the scope of, Supreme Court review on direct appeal"). Unlike Friedman and
Liebman, Hoffstadt does not endorse the appellate model of habeas. Hoffstadt, supra
note 4, at 998. He does note, however, that "[tihe appellate model.., closely
represents how the federal writ currently functions today." Id.
There are also important differences between Supreme Court direct review of
federal claims heard by state courts and habeas claims. The most important
difference is the Supreme Court's role as the final arbiter of federal law under the
Supremacy Clause. See supra notes 39, 44, 53 and accompanying text. Thus the
Supreme Court will always exercise de novo review on questions of law or mixed
questions it is presented with. On the contrary, Congress determines the standard of
review a lower court should apply. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. For
purposes of this Note, the comparison illustrates the interplay between the federal
and state courts for purposes of an appellate review. The standard of review may be
different once the federal court is actually considering the case previously heard in the
state court, but there is still a question of whether the conditions placed on a state
court or on a petitioner should be the same in order to preserve the issue for federal
review.
180. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 330-31.
181. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
182. See Hoffstadt, supra note 4, at 952 (noting that where Congress attempts to
narrow the writ of habeas corpus, it will need to balance "the costs [habeas] imposes
upon state sovereignty and upon the federal courts"); Steiker, supra note 32, at 1703.
183. See Steiker, supra note 32, at 1703. Importantly, the question of interpreting
"adjudicated on the merits" is a very small part of this debate. Instead, the debate
focuses on habeas generally and on the role habeas plays in our overall system of
government and judicial review. This Note seeks to use the debate and its arguments
in favor of habeas as a type of appellate review by the federal courts both to
understand the inclusion of the phrase "adjudicated on the merits" in the habeas
statute, and to develop an interpretation of the phrase based on the role of habeas
within this larger context.
184. See J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to
Federalism; The Burden for Defense Counsel; and the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L.
Rev. 291,295 (1992).
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plays in the overall scheme of the federal criminal system and in
federal review of state court decisions cannot be understated.185
The role of the writ of habeas corpus in protecting important
individual rights is a key reason for the existence of the writ at all. 86
That same goal of protecting individual rights lies at the core of
Supreme Court review of state court decisions as established by the
Marshall Court in the early 1800s.187 The Supreme Court's jurisdiction
to review state court decisions is rarely challenged. In fact,
''commentators generally agree on the need for Supreme Court
review of state court decisions ... [and] [e]ven among those
commentators who argue that Congress could strip the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction to hear certain cases, the strongly prevailing view
is that Congress should not do so." 8'
The reasons for continued support of the federal judiciary's
appellate review power over federal claims arising in state courts 189
also supports the extension of this power to any federal appellate
review court, even where that review is provided through the
consideration of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. That is, the
Supreme Court is the primary provider of this appellate review, even
if it is not able to provide adequate protection to individual
defendants because of its overwhelming caseload.1 9° Moreover, some
believe criminal cases present additional and unique challenges to an
appellate court and require additional fact-finding and other attention
by any appellate court charged with reviewing the many constitutional
claims that arise on appeal in a criminal case. 191 Thus, the argument
goes, the Supreme Court does not have the time or the capacity to
consider the countless factual situations and prior legal rulings that
185. See Steiker, supra note 32, at 1725.
186. See Bowden, supra note 138, at 212 (framing the role of habeas in protecting
individual rights as a means for a sovereign to protect its people's liberty interests).
187. See supra Part I.B.; see also Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux: The Supreme
Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2467, 2481 (1993). Friedman notes
that one of the key functions of Supreme Court direct review of state court decisions
as established by Martin v. Hunter's Lessee is that it "can ensure the vindication of
federal rights." Id. Friedman also observes that Supreme Court direct review not only
helps to protect the rights granted to individuals by the Constitution, but it "assures
the supremacy of federal law," and "ensur[es] that federal law is uniform." Id. at 2481.
188. See Friedman, supra note 187, at 2480. Friedman provides two sources for
those desiring additional information about the value and efficacy of maintaining
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state court decisions. Id. at n.62.
189. See id. at 2482 (noting "the importance of the opportunity to see review in the
Supreme Court of the United States with regard to federal issues resolved in state
court proceedings").
190. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 330-31; Liebman, supra note 25, at 2055.
191. Friedman provides nine reasons that criminal cases are special and potentially
more difficult to review in an appellate court. He then points to the reasons the
Supreme Court may not be best able to handle this appellate role. Friedman, supra
note 187, at 2485-92.
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arise in each criminal appeal."9 Consequently, it is the role of the
habeas review courts to provide those important review functions on
behalf of the Supreme Court; habeas review courts are, in this way,
surrogates for direct Supreme Court review.'93
This view is not entirely surprising because direct review and
habeas play similar roles in the federal criminal system as two means
for prisoners to request review of claims of unconstitutional
incarceration.'94 Although the actual review that may be available to
prisoners may differ under habeas and direct review, both still provide
review for prisoners whose cases fall into certain categories. Both, in
that sense, continue to play the same appellate role in the criminal
system because they are called on to review the decision of another
court. 195
Viewing habeas review in its appellate function within the broader
context of the federal judiciary also provides a better understanding of
how habeas is able to achieve its more general goals. First, by looking
at the purpose and role of habeas and "adjudicated on the merits" in
light of an understanding of the incentive structure provided to state
courts in the Supreme Court's direct review processes, the federal
judiciary will be able to avoid the much-criticized possibility that they
will have to force state courts to draft their opinions in certain ways.196
The method of evaluating whether a federal claim was "drawn in
question" in state courts is well-established, and provides state courts
with the opportunity to rule on federal questions, while ensuring that
these claims are heard. When habeas is viewed through this
framework, states should not feel that the federal courts are asking
them to change their behavior. Instead the states might better
understand that, as with cases that are challenged on direct review, the
states have an opportunity to decide constitutional questions. Where
state courts fail to take advantage of this opportunity-whether by
192. See id. at 2491.
193. See id. at 2482 (arguing that "habeas courts serve as a surrogate for Supreme
Court review"). Friedman notes:
[I]t is apparent that criminal cases present a situation in which no argument
can plausibly be advanced that Supreme Court review is adequate to ensure
supremacy or uniformity, or to vindicate federal rights. If these goals are
important, and there seems little quarrel that they are, the habeas courts
remain the likely-if not the only-possibility for success.
Id. at 2491-92.
194. Liebman, supra note 25, at 2005.
195. Id. at 2009.
196. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 739 (1991) (instructing lower federal
courts that the federal judiciary "has no power to tell state courts how they must write
their opinions"), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277 (1991). Under direct review, however,
the Supreme Court does not tell state courts how to write their opinions. Instead, the
Court provides a means for a petitioner to show that where the state is silent or
provides only a summary opinion, his federal claim was properly raised but was
simply ignored by the state. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 87 (1997);
Wahoske, supra note 72.
20041 2625
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
actually failing to consider a constitutional claim or by failing to
mention that they considered it-federal habeas review courts will
then step in to ensure that individuals' constitutional claims are being
examined.
The federal judiciary was also created to establish and maintain a
unified body of federal law. 197 The Supreme Court is responsible for
overseeing this goal. However, its docket is far too crowded to hear
even a fraction of the federal criminal claims that are raised by state
prisoners. 98 Where the lower federal courts are acting as surrogates
for the Supreme Court in reviewing these matters, and where
Congress has limited that review under AEDPA to allow application
only of Supreme Court precedent, the federal judiciary is better able
to maintain its role as final arbiter of federal law. Further, where the
lower federal courts are acting as surrogates for the Supreme Court,
questions of federalism and comity are no different than they are for
direct review by the Supreme Court. 99
C. Defining "Adjudicated on the Merits"
"Adjudicated on the merits" must be defined by considering how
habeas fits into this larger context of federal judicial review and also
how the goals of habeas are best met. In particular, it is helpful to
look more closely at the "adjudicated on the merits" part of the
habeas statute in comparison with direct review's provision that a
state court must have had a "fair opportunity to address the federal
question."2" This comparison provides a valuable perspective
because habeas and direct review share many of the same
challenges.2"1 Further, the Supreme Court's view that state courts
should have the opportunity to address a federal question before the
question may be heard by a federal court is well established.2 ' The
Court's views thus provide insight into how it might view "adjudicated
on the merits" if it is faced with the issue.
This comparison illustrates that the majority of circuits are wrong in
their interpretation of "adjudicated on the merits" under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d). Instead, a federal habeas court reviewing a state claim
should consider the claim "adjudicated on the merits" only if the state
court, in its opinion, has actually mentioned both the federal claim
and the federal law the court applied in resolving the question so that
it is clear to any reviewing court that the federal claim was truly
addressed. Justifications for this definition closely parallel those
197. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 331.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Adams, 520 U.S. at 86-87 (quoting Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 501
(1981)).
201. See supra Part I.A.-B.
202. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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justifications given by the Court for the "fair opportunity to address
the federal question" prong of direct Supreme Court review.
For example, one reason silent or perfunctory state court opinions
should not be considered "adjudicated on the merits" is that such a
standard provides state courts with no reason ever to address a federal
question raised by a state petitioner. A process in which the federal
court will have to defer to a state court decision regardless of whether
the decision actually considered the federal question actually provides
state courts with an incentive not to consider the federal claim. That
is not to say that state judicial systems do not take their duty to
interpret the Constitution seriously. However, the Supreme Court has
been clear that in order for a claim to be brought on direct review,
states should first have a "fair opportunity to address the federal
question" because it gives state courts their chance to act as
independent interpreters of federal law.2"3 The same reasoning
applies to lower federal courts when they act in an appellate function,
which they do on habeas review. Thus states should also have the
opportunity to address a petitioner's federal claims:
A reading of the AEDPA under which AEDPA deference does not
apply where a State court has rejected a petitioner's claim without
expressly mentioning its federal aspects allows State courts... to
choose whether or not they wish to take on the burden and be
deferred to .... Under this interpretation, State courts that wish
fully to evaluate federal claims need only indicate that they have
done so, and their decisions will be deferred to. Conversely, State
courts that believe that their energy and resources are better
employed elsewhere can remain silent without ... being treated as if
they have given the in depth consideration that AEDPA deference
implicates. 2°4
Judge Calabresi's description of the incentives provided to state
courts to seize their opportunity to interpret and apply federal law
indicates that federal habeas review courts may review silent or
summary state court opinions de novo without taking from those state
courts any of their power under the federal system."5 This is one
reason that silent or summary state decisions must not be considered
"adjudicated on the merits," as state courts that provide only silent or
summary opinions have provided no indication that they seized their
opportunity.
The "fair opportunity to address the federal question" condition of
direct Supreme Court review is also justified on the grounds that it
provides states with the opportunity to justify their decisions on
203. See Adams, 520 U.S. at 91; Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969).





adequate and independent state grounds. °6 The idea that states have
an opportunity to justify decisions that may be considered federal
questions on adequate and independent state grounds also applies in
habeas review ' °7 and provides another reason a state court decision
should not be considered "adjudicated on the merits" where it is
silent, or a summary order.
In general, state procedural default is a common "adequate and
independent state ground" that will preclude federal courts from
reviewing state court decisions on habeas review.2 8 Yet, in cases
where there was no procedural default, states should also have the
opportunity to prosecute criminals under state laws, even where those
laws overlap with federal laws. States are given the opportunity to
enforce their own criminal laws and prosecute their own citizens for
crimes committed in-state. 20 9  However, where a federal claim is
brought that has not been resolved based on an "adequate and
independent state ground," the prisoner has a right to have that claim
litigated.2 0 In a habeas context, then, where a state court has not
mentioned the federal claim or the adequate and independent state
law ground its decision was based on, there is no way for a federal
court reviewing the petition to know if the prisoner's claim was
actually considered on its merits under federal law. That decision
cannot be considered "adjudicated on the merits" because the state
court did not apply either federal law or its own laws. Instead, such a
claim must be heard by some court to protect interests of fairness and
justice, and it should be heard under a de novo standard of review, as
if it had not ever been heard by the state. This treatment is only
available under the pre-AEDPA standard.
Finally, on a more practical level, the Supreme Court has noted that
one reason to encourage states to actually discuss their resolution of a
federal question is that this discussion provides an appellate court
with a more complete record.211 In fact, the Supreme Court, in
Williams v. Taylor, noted that federal habeas review courts should
determine which clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to apply by examining
the state court decision-a task that cannot be accomplished where
the state has provided no legal reasoning or discussion in its
206. Adams, 520 U.S. at 90-91.
207. Federal courts generally may not review habeas claims decided by a state
court on state grounds that are "independent of the merits of the federal claim and an
adequate basis for the court's decision." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Review is allowed, however, if the "last
state court rendering a judgment" does not clearly state that its judgment is based on
adequate and independent state grounds. Id. at 263.
208. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
209. See Wilner, supra note 2, at 1447.
210. See Wilner, supra note 2, at 1447 n.29.
211. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969).
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decision. 12 The Court has also noted that when a state court's
decision is .'an unexplained order (by which we mean an order whose
text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the
judgment)... , attributing a reason is... both difficult and
artificial.' ''213 Thus, when habeas review is viewed as an appellate
function of the judiciary, it is clear that a silent or summary state court
decision should not be considered "adjudicated on the merits"
because there is, in those situations, no record to which the appellate
court may consider or defer. And, importantly, because most habeas
petitions are handled pro se, availability of a record would be even
more important to a reviewing court that will be asked to consider
questions raised by a petitioner who may not have a clear or complete
understanding of the criminal procedures in his state.
CONCLUSION
Despite the view of the majority of circuit courts, silent or summary
state court decisions should not be considered "adjudicated on the
merits." The writ of habeas corpus, and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in particular,
provide appellate review to state prisoners claiming their
constitutional rights have been violated and that they are therefore
being held in custody illegally. The federal system is structured so
that even though the states have independent sovereignty and are
bound to apply and enforce federal law, the federal courts are the
final arbiters of how that law is to be interpreted, and whether it has
been interpreted correctly in any given case. Federal habeas courts
fall within this larger picture of federal judicial review power, and so
the principles upon which that power is built should be considered in
determining how habeas processes should work and how the habeas
statute should be interpreted. Thus, "adjudicated on the merits"
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be defined to encompass state court
decisions on only those federal claims for which a state court has
actually provided some explanation of its decision. To define
"adjudicated on the merits" as the majority of circuits do is to remove
a crucial means of protecting the important individual rights our
Constitution provides.
212. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring, but
delivering the opinion of the Court for Part II (except as to the footnote)); see also
Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2001).
213. Washington, 255 F.3d at 54 (quoting Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-03
(1991)).
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